jectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays b

During the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pledged that Israel “will insist on…fulfillment of United Nations Resolution 1559” which requires the disarming of Hezbollah, while describing the fight with Hezbollah as “a national moment of truth.” President Bush added that, “our goal is to have a lasting peace—not a temporary peace, but something that lasts.” Now that the major combat has ended with the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and its resulting ceasefire, the question arises as to whether ground has been broken on path that could lead to “lasting peace” between Israel and Lebanon.

An examination of the immediate aftermath of the combat suggests that a more likely scenario is a return to the status quo ante in Lebanon. Hezbollah will not be disarmed and it will continue to receive assistance from its Iranian and Syrian patrons. Moreover, the risk of regional instability will have increased with Israel’s doctrine of deterrence having been significantly eroded.

Although Resolution 1701 calls for “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon,” such calls have been par for the proverbial Middle East course. On paper, everything was in order. On the ground, there was no mechanism or desire to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hence, Hezbollah grew into an armed “state within a state” in Lebanon.

Emboldened by its survival in the recent conflict, hailed by public opinion in the Islamic world, and bolstered by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi’s declaration that the UN’s call to disarm Hezbollah is “totally unreasonable” and “illogical,” Hezbollah is in no mood to disarm. Already, Hezbollah has rejected requests that it surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Army.

With Lebanon’s Government dependent on preserving a delicate sectarian balance, it lacks both the determination and will to coerce Hezbollah to disarm. In response to Hezbollah’s unwillingness to disarm, the Lebanese Cabinet indefinitely postponed its meeting concerning implementation of Resolution 1701. Instead, Marwan Hamade, Lebanon’s communications minister could only promise that Lebanon would seek to find a “formula” for implementing the terms of the Resolution. Afterward, on August 15, Al-Hayat reported that the Lebanese Government was working on a compromise agreement that would permit Hezbollah to retain its weapons in south Lebanon in spite of Resolution 1701.

The United Nations is not likely to employ international forces to disarm Hezbollah. The international community has failed to disarm Hezbollah in the past and there is little indication that it would assume the risks necessary to do so at present. Consequently, a path has been laid for Lebanon to drift back to the status quo ante that preceded the conflict.

Even as Lebanon is more than likely to regress to a situation comparable to the one that prevailed prior to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, it will do so at a time when Israel’s doctrine of deterrence has been significantly eroded. That will entail heightened risks of instability in the medium-term and beyond.

Israel went into the conflict with three military options:

• A minimalist approach: Entailed striking a few targets and ending military operations once those targets had been hit.
• A “middle” approach: Entailed carrying out a significant number of strikes and operations, but overall operations would fall well short of a full-scale invasion of south Lebanon or beyond.
• A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon: Such a move would likely have seen the IDF, backed by heavy air support, encircle south Lebanon to cut off Hezbollah from escape, and then direct is efforts at eradicating Hezbollah and its infrastructure from that region.

If there was a benefit to the minimalist approach, it was that such an option could be accomplished quickly. Afterward, with the IDF having hit its targets, few would question whether or not the IDF had a stronger capacity. Israel’s doctrine of deterrence would weakened somewhat given that Israel responded in its usual limited fashion even as Hezbollah crossed a “red line” in carrying out its raid and abductions of Israel’s soil. Given the level of uncertainty over what a major Israeli effort might have achieved, the erosion would have been modest.

A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon would have allowed Israel to destroy a significant portion of Hezbollah and its infrastructure. In terms of dramatically changing the geopolitical landscape and redefining Lebanon’s relationship with Israel, that is the option Israel should have pursued.

The middle approach was the riskiest of all. It required a lot of accuracy and depended on early execution of its robust measures so that there would be sufficient time to achieve the operation’s objectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays be

roups in Lebanon,” such calls have been par for the proverbial Middle East course. On paper, everything was in order. On the ground, there was no mechanism or desire to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hence, Hezbollah grew into an armed “state within a state” in Lebanon.

Emboldened by its survival in the recent conflict, hailed by public opinion in the Islamic world, and bolstered by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi’s declaration that the UN’s call to disarm Hezbollah is “totally unreasonable” and “illogical,” Hezbollah is in no mood to disarm. Already, Hezbollah has rejected requests that it surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Army.

With Lebanon’s Government dependent on preserving a delicate sectarian balance, it lacks both the determination and will to coerce Hezbollah to disarm. In response to Hezbollah’s unwillingness to disarm, the Lebanese Cabinet indefinitely postponed its meeting concerning implementation of Resolution 1701. Instead, Marwan Hamade, Lebanon’s communications minister could only promise that Lebanon would seek to find a “formula” for implementing the terms of the Resolution. Afterward, on August 15, Al-Hayat reported that the Lebanese Government was working on a compromise agreement that would permit Hezbollah to retain its weapons in south Lebanon in spite of Resolution 1701.

The United Nations is not likely to employ international forces to disarm Hezbollah. The international community has failed to disarm Hezbollah in the past and there is little indication that it would assume the risks necessary to do so at present. Consequently, a path has been laid for Lebanon to drift back to the status quo ante that preceded the conflict.

Even as Lebanon is more than likely to regress to a situation comparable to the one that prevailed prior to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, it will do so at a time when Israel’s doctrine of deterrence has been significantly eroded. That will entail heightened risks of instability in the medium-term and beyond.

Israel went into the conflict with three military options:

• A minimalist approach: Entailed striking a few targets and ending military operations once those targets had been hit.
• A “middle” approach: Entailed carrying out a significant number of strikes and operations, but overall operations would fall well short of a full-scale invasion of south Lebanon or beyond.
• A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon: Such a move would likely have seen the IDF, backed by heavy air support, encircle south Lebanon to cut off Hezbollah from escape, and then direct is efforts at eradicating Hezbollah and its infrastructure from that region.

If there was a benefit to the minimalist approach, it was that such an option could be accomplished quickly. Afterward, with the IDF having hit its targets, few would question whether or not the IDF had a stronger capacity. Israel’s doctrine of deterrence would weakened somewhat given that Israel responded in its usual limited fashion even as Hezbollah crossed a “red line” in carrying out its raid and abductions of Israel’s soil. Given the level of uncertainty over what a major Israeli effort might have achieved, the erosion would have been modest.

A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon would have allowed Israel to destroy a significant portion of Hezbollah and its infrastructure. In terms of dramatically changing the geopolitical landscape and redefining Lebanon’s relationship with Israel, that is the option Israel should have pursued.

The middle approach was the riskiest of all. It required a lot of accuracy and depended on early execution of its robust measures so that there would be sufficient time to achieve the operation’s objectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays b

t that would permit Hezbollah to retain its weapons in south Lebanon in spite of Resolution 1701.

The United Nations is not likely to employ international forces to disarm Hezbollah. The international community has failed to disarm Hezbollah in the past and there is little indication that it would assume the risks necessary to do so at present. Consequently, a path has been laid for Lebanon to drift back to the status quo ante that preceded the conflict.

Even as Lebanon is more than likely to regress to a situation comparable to the one that prevailed prior to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, it will do so at a time when Israel’s doctrine of deterrence has been significantly eroded. That will entail heightened risks of instability in the medium-term and beyond.

Israel went into the conflict with three military options:

• A minimalist approach: Entailed striking a few targets and ending military operations once those targets had been hit.
• A “middle” approach: Entailed carrying out a significant number of strikes and operations, but overall operations would fall well short of a full-scale invasion of south Lebanon or beyond.
• A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon: Such a move would likely have seen the IDF, backed by heavy air support, encircle south Lebanon to cut off Hezbollah from escape, and then direct is efforts at eradicating Hezbollah and its infrastructure from that region.

If there was a benefit to the minimalist approach, it was that such an option could be accomplished quickly. Afterward, with the IDF having hit its targets, few would question whether or not the IDF had a stronger capacity. Israel’s doctrine of deterrence would weakened somewhat given that Israel responded in its usual limited fashion even as Hezbollah crossed a “red line” in carrying out its raid and abductions of Israel’s soil. Given the level of uncertainty over what a major Israeli effort might have achieved, the erosion would have been modest.

A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon would have allowed Israel to destroy a significant portion of Hezbollah and its infrastructure. In terms of dramatically changing the geopolitical landscape and redefining Lebanon’s relationship with Israel, that is the option Israel should have pursued.

The middle approach was the riskiest of all. It required a lot of accuracy and depended on early execution of its robust measures so that there would be sufficient time to achieve the operation’s objectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays b

the IDF, backed by heavy air support, encircle south Lebanon to cut off Hezbollah from escape, and then direct is efforts at eradicating Hezbollah and its infrastructure from that region.

If there was a benefit to the minimalist approach, it was that such an option could be accomplished quickly. Afterward, with the IDF having hit its targets, few would question whether or not the IDF had a stronger capacity. Israel’s doctrine of deterrence would weakened somewhat given that Israel responded in its usual limited fashion even as Hezbollah crossed a “red line” in carrying out its raid and abductions of Israel’s soil. Given the level of uncertainty over what a major Israeli effort might have achieved, the erosion would have been modest.

A full-scale ground invasion of south Lebanon would have allowed Israel to destroy a significant portion of Hezbollah and its infrastructure. In terms of dramatically changing the geopolitical landscape and redefining Lebanon’s relationship with Israel, that is the option Israel should have pursued.

The middle approach was the riskiest of all. It required a lot of accuracy and depended on early execution of its robust measures so that there would be sufficient time to achieve the operation’s objectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays b

jectives. The margin for error was small and the stake high. Its inherent danger was that the IDF/IAF would not have sufficient time to score a decisive victory. If that happened or a ceasefire prematurely ended operations, then Hezbollah would be in a position to claim victory for having stood up to a fairly robust Israeli military operation. That is what happened. In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had won a “strategic, historic victory” and Prime Minister Olmert’s declaration that the IDF’s “strength is the main guarantee to preserving and defending our lives on this land” rings hollow.

Undoubtedly, Hezbollah has suffered damage. Its infrastructure had been hammered and its forces were slowly being peeled back at the time the ceasefire took hold. However, at the onset of the ceasefire, Hezbollah demonstrated it still possessed the means to continue fighting and launching rockets in a substantial way. As a result, Hezbollah achieved what no other Arab military force had ever before accomplished against Israel. It remained sufficiently intact to continue to fight.

Prime Minister Olmert's "Hamlet-like" indecision further undermined the already-risky middle approach by imposing lengthy delays before its execution. Based on the inconclusive outcome, perceptions concerning the Middle East's balance of power have continued to shift against Israel and the United States.

Israel has now suffered substantial damage to its ability to deter future acts of aggression. Strategic Forecasting Inc.’s George Friedman explained, “…the loss of the sense—and historical reality—of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.”

The inconclusive outcome will likely have ripple effects well beyond Lebanon even if Hezbollah ultimately disarms. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proclaimed, “The myth of the invincibility of this contrived and decayed regime [Israel's Government] crumbled thanks to the faith and self-belief of Lebanon's Hezbollah.” Syrian President Bashar Assad stated, “We tell them [Israelis] that after tasting humiliation in the latest battles, your weapons are not going to protect you - not your planes, or missiles or even your nuclear bombs ... The future generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel." Salim al-Huss, former Prime Minister of Lebanon, predicted, "I can tell you that some change will take place in the political and ideological realities, owing to the collapse of the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Army." Palestinian political commentator Mustafa Sawwaf stated, “Israel's deterrence force is gone forever and this revives hopes in the Arab world of confronting Israel in the future. The war has also affirmed that Islam constitutes a real threat to Israel, which now realizes that its end is close despite the military power it possesses.”

In the wake of the conflict, Israel is now confronted with the challenge of how to repair its eroded ability to deter aggression. On the political front, Prime Minister Olmert demonstrated that he is not a strong leader of the ilk of a Golda Meir or a Menachem Begin. That could well encourage Syria and Iran to push ahead with their anti-Israel objectives and their proxies to take further risks against Israel. The IDF/IAF is not likely to let the issue rest and there will likely be support within the Knesset for political changes. A failed ceasefire or dramatic retreat on the second UN Security Council resolution—it is likely to be watered-down and might never materialize and both outcomes would solidify a return to the status quo ante—could accelerate Israel’s political change process.

In the end, the situation in Lebanon appears poised to evolve toward one that will closely resemble that which prevailed prior to the conflict. At the same time, with Israel’s ability to deter aggression compromised by the inconclusive outcome, overall risks to regional peace and security will likely be higher than they were prior to the conflict.